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INTRODUCTION  
Extraterritoriality and universal jurisdiction have both 
overlapping and distinct characteristics. An attribute they share with 
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
1
 is that the more one tries to pin down 
their definitions, the more entangled one becomes in intersections 
among the international, transnational, and national, as well as in 
varying understandings of each. This situation might be compared to 
―div[ing] into the fog.‖2 
Many thought that the U.S. Supreme Court would address 
extraterritoriality under the ATS in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
3
 a case 
whose petition for certiorari was already filed at the time the Court 
heard oral arguments in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
4
 on 
what should have been the issue of corporate liability under the 
ATS.
5
 The first issue framed in the Rio Tinto petition for certiorari 
 
† Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
Unless otherwise indicated, translations are mine. 
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
2. See Christian Atias, The Distinction Between Patrimonial and Extra-Patrimonial 
Rights in the Economic Analysis of the Law, HENRI CAPITANT L. REV. (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://henricapitantlawreview.org/article.php?lg=en&id=254 (quoting MICHEL VILLEY, LE 
DROIT ET LES DROITS DE L’HOMME (1983)).  
3. 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 133 S. 
Ct. 1995 (2013), dismissed on other grounds, Nos. 02–56256, 02–56390, 09–56381, 2013 
WL 3357740 (9th Cir. June 28, 2013). 
4. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
5. On appeal from the Second Circuit, the issues presented before the Supreme Court 
were:  
1. Whether the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort 
Statute (―ATS‖), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, is a merits question, as it has been 
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was ―[w]hether U.S. courts should recognize a federal common law 
claim under the ATS arising from conduct occurring entirely within 
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, especially where the claim 
addresses the foreign sovereign’s own conduct on its own soil toward 
its own citizens.‖6 Already at the first Kiobel oral argument, the 
Court seemed noticeably more interested in asking questions about 
extraterritoriality and foreign law than about corporate liability.
7
 A 
few days later, the Court ordered a second reargument of Kiobel on 
the sole issue of ATS extraterritorial jurisdiction.
8
 
I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
 
A. International Law  
The rationale against the extraterritorial application of law arises 
from the tenet that respect for the equal sovereignty of all nations 
requires interdiction against the extraterritorial application of the laws 
of any one nation.
9
 Under traditional international law, it is indeed a 
basic point of departure that national law is territorial and has no 
legal effect beyond its geographical borders, and that States violate 
international law if they exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
foreign conduct that does not affect matters in their territory.
10
 
 
treated by all other courts prior to the decision below, or an issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction, as the court of appeals held for the first 
time.  
2. Whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of 
the law of nations such as torture, extrajudicial executions or genocide, 
as the court of appeals decision provides, or if corporations may be 
sued in the same manner as any other private party defendant under the 
ATS for such egregious violations, as the Eleventh Circuit has 
explicitly held.  
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
6. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d 736 (No. 11-649). 
7. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).   
8. On March 5, 2012, the Court ordered the parties to brief for reargument on: ―Whether 
and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to 
recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory 
of a sovereign other than the United States.‖ Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 
S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.).  
9. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2d ed. 2005). 
10. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (7th ed. 2008) 
(―The governing principle is that a state cannot take enforcement measures on the territory of 
another state without the consent of the latter.‖); 1 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS 
OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS 
ET DES SOUVERAINS §§ 16, 36–37 (Paris, Librairie de Guillaumin et Cie 1863) (analyzing 
nations as the moral equivalents of individuals, concluding that no nation may oblige any 
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 Emmerich de Vattel, whose impact on U.S. law was profound 
and formative through his four-volume work on The Law of Nations, 
as it usually is translated, a more modern translation of which  would 
be ―customary international law,‖ also underscored the right of each 
nation to be free from the interference of any other, even if it chooses 
to behave in a manner deemed savage by others, so long as it does so 
within its own borders.
11
 Vattel criticized Hugo Grotius, the Dutch 
jurist, for taking the view that there was a right to perfect one’s 
neighbor in spite of itself: ―Has not Grotius become aware that . . . 
his view opens the door to all of the furor of enthusiasm and 
fanaticism, and furnishes the zealous with endless pretexts?‖12  
In 1912, Oppenheim’s seminal treatise on international law 
explained that ―[s]tates possessing independence and territorial as 
well as personal supremacy can naturally extend or restrict their 
jurisdiction as far as they like. However, as members of the Family of 
Nations and International Persons, the States must exercise self-
restraint in the exercise of this natural power in the interest of one 
another.‖13 He further concluded that ―[n]o right for a State to extend 
its jurisdiction over acts of foreigners can be said to have grown up 
under the Law of Nations . . . .‖14 
The situation slowly changed, however. According to the French 
Legal Scholar, Mireille Delmas-Marty, the break occurred not with 
the end of the Second World War or the Nuremberg Trials, but with 
the end of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles, which 
made Kaiser Wilhelm judicially subject to extradition,
15
 despite the 
fact that the Dutch government would refuse extradition.
16
 However, 
in 1927, less than a decade after the First World War, the Permanent 
 
other to conduct itself as it did not decide independently); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402–404; Developments in the Law: 
Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1280 (2011).   
11. 2 VATTEL, supra note 10, § 7; see Charles G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel, 8 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 375, 385 (1914). 
12. 2 VATTEL, supra note 10, § 7. Author’s Note: I translated ―enthousiasme‖ as 
―enthusiasm,‖ but, given the context, imagine that in the eighteenth century, the French word 
connoted something closer to fanaticism. 
13. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 201–02 (2d ed. 1912). 
14. Id. at 204. 
15. Mireille Delmas-Marty, La responsabilité pénale en échec: prescription, amnistie, 
immunités, in JURIDICTIONS NATIONALES ET CRIMES INTERNATIONAUX 613 (Antonio Cassese 
& Mireille Delmas-Marty eds., 2002). 
16. CASSESE, supra note 9, at 453–54. 
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Court of International Justice stated in the often-quoted Lotus case 
that, 
[f]ar from laying down a general prohibition to the 
effect that States may not extend the application of 
their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to 
persons, property and acts outside their territory, it 
leaves them in this respect a wide measure of 
discretion which is only limited in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State 
remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as 
best and most suitable.
17
   
Lotus’s correct interpretation and significance is a hotly debated issue 
today, but the successor International Court of Justice has not 
repudiated the principle articulated above, although it gave the 
following qualification in Barcelona Traction:  
It is true that . . . international law . . . leaves to States 
a wide discretion. . . . It does however (a) postulate the 
existence of limits . . . and (b) involve for every State 
an obligation to exercise moderation and restraint as to 
the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in 
cases having a foreign element, and to avoid undue 
encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly 
appertaining to, or more appropriately exercisable by, 
another State.
18
 
In particular, Lotus endorses a State’s right to prescribe 
extraterritorially, distinguishing between prescribing and enforcing.
19
 
It has been observed that the international legal system endorses 
relativism by virtue of the principle of equal national sovereignty, 
since each State’s distinct values and norms are accorded equal 
validity.
20
 At the same time, on a philosophical level, the 
international legal order embraces the abstract universalism of reason 
 
17. S.S. ―Lotus‖ (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7). 
18. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 105 (Feb. 5) 
(separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).  
19. See Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 19; see also Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, 
The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 142, 142 & 
n.2 (2006). 
20. See, e.g., MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, ETUDES JURIDIQUES ET COMPARATIVES ET 
INTERNATIONALISATION DU DROIT 52 (2003). 
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that undergirds natural law.
21
 Delmas-Marty advocates pluralism 
without relativism, and suggests that ―pluralism has its limits.‖22 
B. United States Law 
U.S. courts apply a long-standing presumption against the 
extraterritorial effect of federal laws.
23
 An instance of vigorous 
application came in 2010 in Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd.,
24
 a securities case involving foreign plaintiffs, a foreign 
defendant, and securities sold on a foreign stock exchange. The 
Supreme Court ruled that Section 10(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act did not encompass the case under consideration.
25
 The 
Court first reasoned that ―when a federal statute gives no clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,‖26 and that 
Section 10(b) of the statute was primarily focused on the acts of 
purchase and sale, none of which had occurred in the United States in 
the case at issue.
27
 Five Justices limited Section 10(b) to ―the 
purchase of such a security listed on an American stock exchange, 
and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.‖28 
The next year, in J. McCyntire Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,
29
 the 
Supreme Court found that a New Jersey court lacked jurisdiction over 
a British company, which had sold a product it manufactured to a 
separately owned company in Ohio for distribution in the United 
States.
30
 More specifically, the Court rejected the defendant’s 
jurisdictional argument that jurisdiction was established by the 
defendant’s product placement in the stream of commerce, which 
targeted U.S. consumers.
31
 The Court found, rather, that the absence 
of any other business contacts between the manufacturer and the 
forum state of New Jersey was insufficient to constitute ―activities in 
New Jersey that reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the 
 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 120.  
23. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
24. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
25. Id.at 2881 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)). 
26. Id. at 2878. 
27. Id. at 2888. 
28. Id. 
29. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
30. Id. at 2790–91.  
31. Id. 
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protection of its laws.‖32   
One perspective on the contemporary trend is that the United 
States has been demonstrating ―[i]ncreasing hostility towards 
extraterritorialism [and that this has] culminated in Kiobel . . .‖33 
Morrison involved an alleged ―manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance . . . .‖34 ―in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered . . . .‖35 Nicastro involved product liability in a 
personal injury case when a New Jersey metal worker injured his 
hand while using defendant’s product, a shearing machine.36 
Although the Supreme Court majority in Kiobel evoked this line of 
cases in reasoning that the ATS can have no extraterritorial 
application in foreign-cubed cases, neither Morrison nor Nicastro, 
unlike Kiobel, involved universal jurisdiction, or, thus, the grave 
human rights violations that ATS jurisdiction signifies: jus cogens 
crimes.   
In theory, universal jurisdiction must imply extraterritoriality, 
but only to a strictly limited category of cases. It is this last factor that 
would distinguish ATS cases, which by statutory requirement are 
limited to violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States,
37
 except for the fact that the current era of ATS suits, unlike 
the prior ones, has focused primarily on multinational corporate 
defendants.
38
 Thus, although Morrison and Nicastro did not deal with 
jus cogens violations, contemporary United States universal 
jurisdiction cases do deal with corporations. 
In Kiobel, the Second Circuit would have allowed universal 
jurisdiction and extraterritoriality to proceed unabatedly, so long as 
the corporate defendant could be shielded from liability.
39
 In 2010, 
the Second Circuit held that corporate defendants were not liable 
under the ATS, and that same year, the Supreme Court decided 
 
32. Id. at 2791. 
33. Jodie A. Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational 
Corporations to Europe?: Extraterritorialism, Sovereignty and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 259, 274 (2012). This prescient comment was made before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel. 
34. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010).  
35. Id.  
36. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786. 
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
38. See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
39. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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Citizens United v. FEC,
40
 finding that corporations, like natural 
people, had a First Amendment right of free expression.
41
 When the 
Court granted certiorari in Kiobel, the issue on appeal was whether 
corporations could be held responsible as ATS defendants.
42
 The 
Court decided to change the issue to that of extraterritoriality under 
the ATS sua sponte, and it found that it did not need to consider the 
first question, having decided the second one.
43
  
In light of Citizens United, it is possible that the Court preferred 
to examine whether there was a basis for limiting the ATS’ scope 
other than the corporate nature of the defendant, in the event that it 
decided to limit the ATS, even though the Ninth Circuit had 
addressed extraterritoriality in Rio Tinto and a petition for certiorari 
was pending on that very issue before the Court in that case,
44
 while 
in Kiobel the Second Circuit had only skimmed the issue of 
extraterritoriality.
45
 After deciding Kiobel, the Court vacated its writ 
of certiorari in Rio Tinto and remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of Kiobel.
46
 Not only did the majority in the 
end decline to adjudicate the issue of corporate liability, but it also 
analyzed extraterritoriality outside of the context of universal 
jurisdiction. 
II. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
Universal jurisdiction, arising from the idea that some crimes are 
so repugnant to all humankind that any nation may try the 
perpetrators, has made an important inroad into the principle against 
extraterritoriality. It has been said that 
universal jurisdiction [is] founded on the sheer 
heinousness of certain crimes, such as genocide and 
torture, which are universally condemned and which 
 
40. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).   
41. Id. at 913.  
42. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at i. 
43. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
44. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5. 
45. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 
S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
46. Rio Tinto, PLC, v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (mem.). On June 28, 2013, in 
accordance with the Supreme Court remand for a ruling consistent with its opinion in Kiobel, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit against Rio Tinto in an 
order without an opinion. Id. 
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every state has an interest in repressing even in the 
absence of traditional connecting factors. . . . [T]hough 
subject to evolution, the roster of crimes presently 
covered by universal jurisdiction includes . . . 
genocide, torture, some war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.
47
  
In reality, contemporary universal jurisdiction cases, such as the 
Nuremberg trial cases, reflect a high frequency of cooperation, 
participation, and even incitement by States in which the alleged 
harms occurred. Indeed, in the case that reincarnated the ATS after a 
dormancy of two centuries, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,
48
 as well as those 
that characterized the first generation of modern ATS cases, 
defendants were State actors of foreign States.
49
 In the subsequent 
decades, when multinational corporations became the primary 
defendants,
50
 State actors of the States in which the alleged jus 
cogens violations occurred often were alleged to be complicit or, as 
in Kiobel, the corporate defendants complicit in crimes committed by 
foreign State actors.
51
 Consensus concerning the universality of the 
evil involved in jus cogens crimes provides justification for the 
theory of making jurisdiction universal, but logic alone makes clear 
that there would be no need for universal jurisdiction if the States in 
which the crimes are committed were not themselves often complicit 
or, worse, the instigators and primary perpetrators. 
III. THE CHALLENGE OF KIOBEL 
Kiobel involved more than international and U.S. law; it also 
involved foreign domestic law and, as a consequence, questions of 
comparative law. A key concern of the Court during both oral 
arguments seemed to focus around the United States being alone in 
allowing civil, as opposed to criminal, jurisdiction in an exercise of 
extraterritorial universal jurisdiction.
52
 The Court repeatedly inquired 
about the practice of other countries, and a perusal of amicus briefs 
 
47. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 19, at 143. 
48. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
49. See Factsheet: Alien Tort Statute, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., http://ccrjustice.org/learn-
more/faqs/factsheet%3A-alien-tort-statute (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).  
50. See Doe v. Unocal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d, 248 F.3d 915 (9th 
Cir. 2001). Doe was the first time a suit against a multinational corporation proceeded. Id. 
51. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. 
Ct. 1659 (2013). 
52. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7; Transcript of Oral 
Reargument, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
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filed on behalf of defendants reflects many amici authors arguing that 
the extraterritorial exercise of civil universal jurisdiction would be a 
breach of international law.
53
  
Kiobel presents the challenge of crossing legal cultures and 
categories. Just as the linguistic level is replete with false friends,
54
 so 
too at the legal level, appearances and categorizations are deceptive. 
Our courts are in an open struggle with their manner of accessing 
foreign law, as the three opinions of the Seventh Circuit in Bodum 
USA, Inc. v. La Cafetière, Inc.
55
 illustrated in 2010. Judges 
Easterbrook and Posner set forth reasons against using party experts 
as the favored method of understanding applicable law, despite their 
jurisdiction’s favoring that method, while their colleague, Judge 
Wood, disagreed.
56
   
Kiobel’s foreign or comparative law element was not 
immediately apparent. As an ATS case, it naturally raised issues 
relating to a domestic federal statute. Since the ATS expressly deals 
with violations of the law of nations, or customary international law, 
the case also concerned international law. International law, however, 
ultimately is an issue of how States mutually understand agreements 
between themselves, and the standards that govern the international 
legal system—the ordre public. It is perhaps worth noting at the 
outset that, with respect to international legal standards, according to 
Sir Ian Brownlie, ―in principle [there is] no difference between the 
problems created by the assertion of criminal and civil jurisdiction 
over aliens.‖57 At Kiobel’s second oral argument, those Justices 
 
53. Defendants (respondents) also made this argument. The respondent’s brief and amici 
briefs are available from the American Bar Association. Preview of United States Supreme 
Court Cases: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.american 
bar.org/publications/preview_home/10-1491.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
54. Author’s Note: For example, the French éventuel and German eventuell mean 
possible, not eventual in English; additionally, the French actuel and German aktuell mean 
current, not actual in English. 
55. 621 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2010). 
56. Id. at 628–29 (arguing, for the majority, against the use of experts because French 
law is widely available in English); id. at 631–32 (Posner, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
court is not limited to relying on testimony to determine foreign law); id. at 638–39 
(Wood, J., concurring) (arguing that expert testimony may be necessary in order to avoid 
misinterpretation through translation). For an overview of the Bodum debate, see Frederick 
Gaston Hall, Not Everything Is As Easy As a French Press: The Dangerous Reasoning of the 
Seventh Circuit on Proof of Foreign Law and a Possible Solution, 43 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 1457, 
1464–73 (2012). 
57. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 300.  
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concerned about the United States’ not applying a unique law 
extraterritorially
58
 asked questions from a common law 
understanding of the meaning and function of civil and criminal law, 
and from an assumption that this understanding was the same as that 
of the rest of the world, or of the rest of the ―civilized nations,‖ since 
theirs is the practice the Court attends to in determining ATS 
standards.
59
 In fact, the States looked to in Kiobel were primarily 
Western European nations, principally Germany and France.
60
 The 
Netherlands and Britain were referred to inasmuch as petitioners 
argued that they have civil universal jurisdiction,
61
 while respondents 
argued to the contrary, pointing out that both of those governments 
had filed amicus briefs objecting to U.S. civil extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.
62
 
At a basic level, the civil and common law nations differentiate 
between the concept of a criminal and a civil offense in a comparable 
manner. Murder, for example, is a criminal offense in both systems, 
unintentional torts a civil offense in both. Some acts have been 
categorized as criminal offenses in one system and civil in another, 
such as defamation, traditionally a criminal offense in civilian States 
and a civil one in common law States, but that categorization under 
the influence of globalization is not set in stone, as a challenge started 
in 2008 to its criminal categorization in France demonstrates, 
although it has remained unsuccessful to date.
63
 
Based on the above analysis, there is little reason to question the 
basic similarity of meaning when a civilian jurist and an American 
one refer to criminal versus civil law, and this was the assumption of 
all involved in Kiobel. After the Court asked for renewed briefing and 
oral argument on the issue of extraterritoriality, this author wrote a 
 
58. See Linda J. Silberman, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Implications for 
Global Securities Class Actions, in 12 YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 
(2010) (discussing a similar concern in Morrison). 
59. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (―[W]e think courts 
should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.‖). 
60. See Kiobel v. Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 
1659 (2013). 
61. Petitioners’ Supplemental Reply Brief at 17, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
62. Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 3, 40, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
63. See, e.g., Laurence de Charette & Johan Prorok, La dépénalisation de la diffamation 
bientôt débattue, LE FIGARO, Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/ 
2008/12/02/01016-20081202ARTFIG00309-la-depenalisation-de-la-diffamation-bientot-
debattue-.php. 
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brief on behalf of Comparative Law scholars and a French Supreme 
Court Justice, who has sat both on the Constitutional Council and the 
Council of State of France, to alert the Supreme Court to functional 
differences in criminal and civil law in the two legal systems that are 
so profound as to mean that U.S. civil universal jurisdiction is 
analogous and equivalent to civilian criminal universal jurisdiction, 
and that ATS extraterritorial jurisdiction is well within current 
international law standards.
64
 
The key difference between the two legal orders is that U.S. tort 
law fulfills many of the functions of civilian criminal law, while its 
criminal law system would be less well-adapted to universal 
jurisdiction cases.
65
 Conversely, in civilian States, the criminal law 
system affords victims opportunities similar to those that the U.S. tort 
system affords, while civilian civil courts are less well-suited for 
universal jurisdiction cases. In Continental Europe, the criminal 
prosecutor often is part of the magistrature, called a ―standing judge,‖ 
as opposed to a ―sitting‖ one.66 Unlike in the United States, in civilian 
States, prosecutors tend to be neutral, non-partisan figures who have 
no professional interest in amassing convictions, and who are trained 
and obliged to garner exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence.
67
  
A crucial annex to the prosecutor’s ability and resources to 
uncover relevant evidence is the civilian system’s mechanism for 
victim participation in criminal trials, victim financial compensation 
ensuing from them, and for victim initiation of criminal trials; 
essentially, all the features of U.S. tort trials and none of the 
attributes of U.S. criminal trials. Both the U.S. tort and the civilian 
 
64. Brief of Amici Curiae Comparative Law Scholars and French Supreme Court Justice 
in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491); see also Vivian Grosswald 
Curran, Mass Torts and Universal Jurisdiction, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2013). 
65. See Curran, supra note 64; Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization, Legal 
Transnationalization and Crimes Against Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 
363, 382–83 (2008); see also Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and 
International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights 
Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L. L. 1, 19 (2002) (describing how many civil law systems allow 
victims to seek damages as part of a criminal prosecution). 
66. For France, see Loi 58-1270 du 22 Déc. 1958 portant loi organique relative au statut 
de la magistrature, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte= 
JORFTEXT000000339259; for Belgium, see 1994 CONST. art. 15(2); and for Italy, see Art. 
104 Costituzione (It.). 
67. See Philip Milburn & Denis Salas, Les procureurs de la République: De la 
compétence personnelle à l’identité collective, in Etude sociologique et étude comparative 
européenne 137 (2007); Curran, supra note 65, at 377–78. 
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criminal trial are largely victim-driven, and give victims an 
opportunity to bring important issues to the public’s attention.68 By 
contrast, the civilian civil trial is a private matter, often entirely in 
writing, with no oral testimony whatsoever. In France in particular, 
even the lawyers’ submissions to courts are the intellectual property 
of their authors, and unavailable to the public unless the lawyers 
make them available.
69
 When crimes against humanity suits have 
been attempted in civil courts in some civilian States because the 
plaintiffs were for technical reasons unable to pursue their suits in 
criminal court, the legal and lay public both have been known to react 
with considerable derision, in large measure because the plaintiffs’ 
selection of the civil court prevented issues of historical, political, 
and social importance from being aired in public.
70
  
The civilian legal order also has no equivalent to the U.S. class 
action suit, since class actions countermand the deeply entrenched 
civilian principle that all justice must be individual.
71
 This difference 
was, moreover, an express concern of Justice Scalia in his Morrison 
opinion.
72
 Whereas civilian victims have access to the resources of 
the State through the criminal court, they must use their own 
resources to finance suits in civil court in a system, which, unlike its 
U.S. counterpart, forbids U.S.-style contingency fee arrangements as 
unethical.
73
 Moreover, civilian civil suits, unlike their U.S. 
homologues, do not allow punitive damages, considering them to be 
appropriate solely to criminal law.
74
 All things considered, the U.S. 
tort suit functions in a manner analogous to the civilian criminal suit, 
and conversely, for purposes of determining that the two systems 
 
68. See JOHN BELL, FRENCH LEGAL CULTURES 141 (2001). On the importance of public 
discourse to U.S. tort law, see JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL 
BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2006). 
69. Curran, supra note 65, at 377.   
70. See id. at 373–80. 
71. See 1958 CONST. art. 66 (Fr.) (stating that members of the judiciary are guardians of 
individual liberty); Nouveau code de procédure civile [N.C.P.C.] art. 31 (Fr.) (requiring that 
the plaintiff's interest in a cause of action be direct and personal). Note also the legal maxim 
that ―none may plead by representation‖ (―nul ne plaide par procureur‖). 
72. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2885 (2010). 
73. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS R. 3.3 (2006) (forbidding the 
contingency fee or ―pactum quota litis‖), available at http://anwaltverein.de/downloads/ 
praxis/berufsrecht/2006-code-of-conduct.pdf. The majority of EU member states have 
adopted the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers. Status of the CCBE Code of Conduct at 
a National Level, CCBE (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTC 
document/Table_adoption_of_th1_1358409892.pdf. 
74. See Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages: A European Perspective, 68 LA. L. REV. 741, 
751 (2008); see also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, 
LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA 1022 (1994).  
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have an operational equivalence in their respective modes of 
exercising universal jurisdiction. It was in this context that the issue 
of the ATS might have been considered more fruitfully, before 
concluding that extraterritorial application of the ATS would make 
the United States, in the words of the majority, ―a uniquely hospitable 
forum for the enforcement of international norms.‖75  
CONCLUSION 
Modern catastrophes are ever more extraterritorial as technology 
increases their breadth and reach. Human rights law is rooted in 
claims of universalism, but anchored, for the most part, in the 
national courts in which actions are brought. The Kiobel case was 
situated at the intersection of two lines of cases. The first line was 
Filártiga and its progeny, with the Supreme Court endorsing in Sosa 
the applicability of the ATS to ―foreign-cubed‖ cases of grave crimes 
against humanity: namely where plaintiff and defendant are foreign, 
and where the relevant acts occurred abroad. The second line harks to 
the presumption that federal statutes do not have extraterritorial 
application, and in recent applications includes EEOC v. Arabian 
American Oil Co.,
76
 Nicastro,
77
 and Morrison.
78
 Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion in Kiobel struck a compromise between the two 
lines. Without relinquishing the importance of nexus to the United 
States and echoing the majority opinion and his own often articulated 
concern for attending to foreign relation concerns, his concurring 
opinion underscored his continuing vision of the ATS as a vehicle for 
the extraterritorial application of jus cogens law.
79
   
It remains to be seen how norms of international law will be 
carried out in the future. The era of the direct effect of international 
law is in transition. European (and other, such as Canadian) States are 
adopting the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
80
 in 
part or whole into their national legal orders, and some, like France, 
 
75. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668 (2013). 
76. 499 U.S. 244, 277 (1991) (denying extraterritorial application of Title VII protections 
to U.S. citizen while employed in Saudi Arabia). 
77. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011). 
78. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
79. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
80. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
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with incremental bills to be inserted at various times as part of 
national law.
81
 It has been somewhat over half a century since the 
Nuremberg trials and the events that preceded them catapulted the 
individual into becoming a subject of international law, and since law 
began to articulate standards of international human rights based on 
the hindsight of what had gone wrong.   
We have come a long way since Helmuth von Moltke, a young 
German lawyer fighting the Nazi machine tooth and nail from within 
the ranks of the German Abwehr, or military intelligence, saved 
thousands of lives by cajoling and menacing colleagues and  
superiors with the specter of an international humanitarian law that he 
sometimes formulated as he went along, and at a time when Lord 
Lothian, a British ambassador to the United States, could maintain 
that there was no such thing as international law.
82
 The role of the 
multinational corporation today with traits akin to a State as well as 
to a non-State actor suggest that Kiobel is only a step, and not the 
final destination, in a road with many turns to come.  
 
81. In 2010, French law incorporated the Rome Statute with respect to genocide and 
crimes against humanity, Loi 2010-930 du 9 août 2010 portant adaptation du droit penal à 
l’institution de la Cour pénale international, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.], Aug. 10, 2008, p. 14678, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/aff 
ichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022681235&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id. A more 
expansive bill is in committee. See Antoine Reverchon, Affaires criminelles, LE MONDE, 
Mar. 25, 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2013/03/25/affairescriminelles_18 
53684_3234.html. 
82. On Lord Lothian, see MICHAEL BALFOUR & JULIAN FRISBY, HELMUTH VON MOLTKE: 
A LEADER AGAINST HITLER (1972). For two accounts of von Moltke’s resistance, see id. and 
HELMUTH VON MOLTKE: LETTERS TO FREYA 1939-1945 (Beate Ruhm von Oppen ed. & 
trans., 1990).  
